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____________ 
 
BAO HUI CHEN,  
 
                                        Petitioner 
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                                          Respondent 
____________ 
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Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
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Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic C. Leeds 
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 District Judge 
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*
The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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Theodore N. Cox 
Suite 701 
401 Broadway 
New York, NY 10013-0000 
 Attorneys for Petitioner  
 
Benjamin Zeitlin [Argued] 
Sharon M. Clay 
Eric H. Holder 
Thomas W. Hussey 
United States Department of Justice  
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division  
P.O. Box 878  
Ben Franklin Station  
Washington, DC 20044  
 Attorneys for Respondent 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Bao Hui Chen, a citizen of China and a native of Fujian province, seeks review of 
a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision reversing the Immigration Judge‟s (IJ) 
grant of asylum.  We will deny Chen‟s petition and affirm the BIA‟s order of removal. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history, we summarize them only briefly. 
 Chen entered the United States without inspection on July 10, 2001.  On October 
7, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued a Notice to Appear, 
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charging Chen with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Before the IJ, Chen 
conceded removability, but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 
 The IJ heard testimony on the merits of Chen‟s asylum application on December 
15, 2008.  Chen testified that he and his wife, Lung Yiu Tai, have four children, all of 
whom were born in China.  In 1996, Chen‟s wife was subjected to forced sterilization.  In 
addition, the family was fined a total of 21,000 RMB for violating China‟s family 
planning policies.
1
  Chen, who earned 800 RMB per month (or 9,600 RMB per year) as a 
construction worker, was forced to borrow 11,000 RMB from his family and friends to 
pay off a portion of the fines.  Chen testified that “[t]he[] heavy fines crippled [him] as a 
sole provider for the family,” and he stated that he “had no choice but to flee from 
China.”  App. 578.  He borrowed an additional $50,000 from his family and friends, and 
hired a snakehead to smuggle him into the United States.  Since his arrival to this 
country, Chen has been able to pay back the 11,000 RMB he borrowed from his family 
and friends, as well as the 9,000 RMB fine imposed in 2001.
2
  He has also sent enough 
                                                 
1
 The parties dispute the timing of these fines.  While agreeing that Chen was 
forced to pay a total of 11,000 RMB prior to leaving the country in 2001, the Government 
maintains that the additional 9,000 RMB fine was imposed only after his wife sought 
documentation to support his asylum application.  Chen claims that the entire 21,000 
RMB fine was assessed in 1996, and that the various payments over the years (including 
the 9,000 RMB fine) were installments on the single fine. 
2
 It is not clear whether Chen has repaid the $50,000 loan he borrowed from his 
family to pay the snakehead.  
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money to his family to pay for his children‟s medical care and educational expenses and 
to maintain the family home. 
 After hearing Chen‟s testimony and considering “a number of corroborating 
documents verifying his situation,” the IJ determined that Chen was credible.  App. 21.  
The IJ also held that the 21,000 RMB fine imposed on Chen‟s family—which exceeded 
two years‟ salary—was a severe economic deprivation giving rise to a presumption of 
future persecution.
3
  In so holding, the IJ expressly rejected the Government‟s assertion 
that a person who pays a snakehead $50,000 must be able to afford the lesser fine of 
21,000 RMB (or approximately $3,095).  The IJ found that Chen‟s $50,000 loan was an 
“invest[ment] in his future . . . to pay off the debt he owed in his home country where he 
had over two years of economic wage loss impacting him.”  App. 23-24.4 
 In a decision dated December 9, 2009, the BIA reversed the IJ‟s grant of asylum 
and ordered Chen deported.  Finding that Chen “was able to pay off the fines with loans 
from friends and relatives,” “obtain the assistance of a smuggler to travel to the United 
States,” and “pay for medical care and the education of his children,” the BIA concluded 
                                                 
 
3
 Although the IJ held that it need not reach Chen‟s claims for withholding of 
removal or relief under the CAT, it noted that Chen “would have met his burden of proof 
under these theories as well.”  App. 26. 
4
 The IJ was also unconvinced by the Government‟s claim that because Chen‟s 
family remained in their home, they did not suffer any economic deprivation.  The IJ 
explained that the family‟s well-being depended entirely on Chen‟s income in the United 
States, and again, was not a reflection of Chen‟s earning capacity in China.   
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that Chen did not suffer a severe economic deprivation and thus “failed to establish that 
he suffered . . . past persecution.”  App. 10 (citing Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 169 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (holding that “a fine of more than a year and a half‟s salary; blacklisting from 
any government employment and from most other forms of legitimate employment; the 
loss of health benefits, school tuition, and food rations; and the confiscation of household 
furniture and appliances from a relatively poor family constitute deliberate imposition of 
severe economic disadvantage which could threaten [the] family‟s freedom if not their 
lives . . . .”)).  The BIA also held that Chen “has not demonstrated a reasonable 
possibility that he will be persecuted for „other resistance‟ to the coercive population 
control rules in China.” 
 Chen filed a timely petition for review. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA‟s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a).  Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007).  We review the 
BIA‟s findings for substantial evidence and may not disturb them “„unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.‟”  Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 
F.3d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).  Where the BIA renders 
its own decision and does not merely adopt the opinion of the IJ, we review the BIA‟s 
decision, not that of the IJ.  Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an applicant may demonstrate 
eligibility for asylum by showing either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  In Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157 
(3d Cir. 2005), we held that “the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage 
which threatens a petitioner‟s life or freedom may constitute persecution.”  Id. at 168 
(adopting the “severe” economic deprivation standard set forth in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. 
& N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985)).
5
 
 Chen claims the BIA discounted “substantial and highly relevant” evidence in the 
record that he suffered a “severe” economic deprivation due to his resistance to China‟s 
family planning policies.  Specifically, he argues that the BIA failed to consider evidence 
that he was denied government benefits, such as free health care and educational services, 
following the birth of his fourth child.  In his testimony before the IJ, however, Chen 
maintained only that he paid for his children‟s medical expenses and education himself, 
App. 235; he did not testify that he did so because the government denied him these 
                                                 
5
 Zhen Hua Li was a mechanic who worked in a government-sponsored factory.  
Li, 400 F.3d at 160.  Following the birth of his fourth child, Li was effectively blacklisted 
from all government employment, stripped of the health and educational benefits 
associated with government work, and fined a total of 1,200 RMB (the equivalent of 
twenty-months‟ salary).  Id. at 169.  Chinese authorities also confiscated Li‟s refrigerator, 
television, and other household items that Li alleged were “significant objects.”  Id.  We 
stated that while the “issue is close,” id. at 159, in the aggregate, “the economic 
restrictions allegedly faced by the Li family were „severe.‟”  Id. at 169. 
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services to punish him for his resistance to family planning policies.  Cf. Li, 400 F.3d at 
169 (finding that the loss of the alien‟s government job in China constituted a loss in “not 
only income, but also health coverage, food and medicine rations, and educational 
benefits”).  Moreover, while the record reflects that Chen‟s wife was refused public 
notary services because of the family‟s outstanding debts to the state, this deprivation 
does not constitute a “severe” economic deprivation. 
Chen also argues that the BIA failed to consider the IJ‟s finding that Chen would 
not have been able to pay off his fines had he not moved to the United States.  However, 
Chen bears the burden of showing that he suffered “persecution in the past,” 8 C.F.R. § 
208.13, not that he would have suffered persecution had circumstances been different.  As 
the BIA explained, the “availability of other sources of income has been a key factor in 
assessing the impact of economic sanctions.”  In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 174 (B.I.A. 
2007) (citing Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that an 
alien‟s loss of a job and an apartment based on religion and ethnicity did not amount to 
past persecution where the government had given him eight months to find a new 
residence, his wife remained employed, and he had not attempted to find other work) and 
Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the forced closing 
of an alien‟s restaurant did not constitute past persecution where he continued to operate 
other profitable businesses)).  Thus, while a fine that “reduce[s] an applicant to an 
impoverished existence” may give rise to a valid claim for asylum, a “heavy fine leveled 
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against a wealthy individual” will not qualify as a “severe” economic disadvantage “if the 
person remains relatively wealthy and experienced no meaningful change in life style or 
standard of living.”  Id.; see Mirisawo v. Holder, 599 F.3d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that a citizen of Zimbabwe could not claim that the destruction of her home 
deprived her of a basic necessity of life, because she “never lived in the house and was 
living and working in the United States as a live-in housekeeper”). 
 Here, it is undisputed that Chen was able to earn enough money in the United 
States to pay off his fines to the Chinese Government.  Moreover, the record is clear that 
Chen and his family continued to receive shelter, food, health care, education, and other 
basic necessities throughout the relevant time period.  Thus, substantial evidence supports 
the BIA‟s finding that Chen‟s family did not suffer a “severe” economic deprivation due 
to the imposition of the 21,000 RMB fine.  Compare App. 9 (finding that Chen‟s “family 
continued to reside in the same house, and the respondent was able to pay for medical 
care and the education of his children”), with Cheng v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 194 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that “the seizure of property as significant as the family farm and 
truck, when those very assets served as the exclusive source of the family‟s livelihood, 
constitutes a severe economic sanction”). 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the BIA‟s holding that Chen has not shown 
that he suffered past economic persecution in his country of origin.  Moreover, we agree 
with the BIA that because Chen has fully repaid the 21,000 RMB fine to the Chinese 
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Government, he no longer has a reasonable fear of economic deprivation due to his 
unpaid debt to the State.  Accordingly, we will deny Chen‟s petition for review. 
1 
 
POLLAK, District Judge, concurring. 
I concur in the court’s opinion and judgment.  I think it appropriate to add a few 
words. 
After argument I was of the view that the BIA’s order denying asylum to Bao Hui 
Chen was in error and that Chen’s petition for review should be granted.  The imposition 
on Chen of fines totaling nearly 21,000 RMB, the equivalent of more than two years’ 
wages, seemed economic deprivation so acute as to constitute economic persecution.  I 
was strengthened in this preliminary view by the fact that the fines imposed on Chen 
actually exceeded, albeit modestly so, the fines imposed on Zhen Hua Li, whose case this 
court considered in Li v. Attorney General, 400 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2005).  There, this court 
held that Li’s allegations, if established, did constitute economic persecution.  But my 
post-argument assessment has proved inadequate.  I am persuaded by this court’s opinion 
that, notwithstanding the similarity in fines, there are decisive differences between 
Chen’s case and Li’s case which weigh against Chen’s claim.  Chen suffered no sanctions 
additional to the fines.  By contrast, (1) Li lost his government job, and was blacklisted 
from further government employment; (2) Li and his family lost medical and educational 
benefits; and (3) a number of household furnishings were confiscated from his home.  
And in Judge Becker’s opinion for the court in Li v. Attorney General, it was these severe 
incremental deprivations on top of the fines that were key to this court’s conclusion that 
Li was the subject of economic persecution.  Id. at 169. 
The holding in this case is that the fines imposed on Chen, though “onerous” as 
the BIA characterized them, were not so severe an economic deprivation as to constitute 
2 
 
economic persecution, and, hence, that Chen was not entitled to asylum.  I join that 
holding. 
But beyond this court’s holding this case entails a cautionary lesson.  When Li’s 
case arose, the BIA ruled that Li did not qualify for asylum.  This court ruled otherwise.  
In ruling on the case at bar the BIA found that Chen was not as oppressively 
disadvantaged as Li, and we today conclude that the BIA adduced substantial evidence in 
support of that finding.  But it would, I think, be a mistake to draw the inference that the 
quantum of economic deprivation suffered by Li is the minimum standard that must be 
met by one claiming economic persecution.  I would suggest that the BIA and this court 
must be alert to scenarios involving punishments which, while grave and lasting, may 
take forms different from those visited on Li, or are only marginally less destabilizing 
than those suffered by Li.  The economic deprivation so daunting as to constitute 
economic persecution is not a closed category. 
